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Till taught by pain, men know not water's worth.  Byron 
 
INTRODUCTION1 
 
 
As human populations and economies grow 
exponentially, the amount of freshwater in the world 
remains roughly the same as it has been throughout 
history.  While the total quantity of water in the world is 
immense, the vast majority is either saltwater (97.5 
percent) or locked up in ice caps (1.75 percent).  The 
amount economically available for human use is only 
0.007 percent of the total, or about 13,500 km3.   This 
comes out to only about 2300 m3 per person – a 37 
percent drop since 1970 (United Nations 1997).  Adding 
complexity to this increasing scarcity is the fact that 
almost half the globe’s land surface lies within 
international watersheds (i.e., that land which 
contributes to the world's 261 transboundary 
waterways). 
 
The scarcity of water in an arid and semi-arid 
environment leads to intense political pressures, often 
referred to as “water stress.”  Furthermore, water not 
only ignores political boundaries; it evades institutional 
classification and eludes legal generalizations.  The 
1997 Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses Commission is vague and 
occasionally contradictory, and international agencies 
have historically been limited in coordination or 
strategy. 
 
While water quantity has been the major issue of this 
century, water quality has been neglected to the point of 
catastrophe. The numbers are staggering: 
 
• More than a billion people lack access to safe water 
supplies; 
• Almost three billion do not have access to adequate 
sanitation; 
• Five million people die each year from water-related 
diseases or inadequate sanitation; 
• Twenty percent of the world's irrigated lands are salt-
laden to the point of affecting production. 
 
Water demands are increasing, groundwater levels are 
dropping, surface-water supplies are increasingly 
contaminated, and delivery and treatment infrastructures 
are aging.  The World Bank estimates that it would take 
$600 billion to repair and improve the world's existing 
water delivery systems (CAFRW 1997). 
 
When all of these characteristics are put together – water 
as a critical, non-substitutable resource, which flows and 
fluctuates across time and space, for which legal 
principles are vague and contradictory, and which is 
becoming relatively more scarce and degraded as world 
populations and standards of living grow – compelling 
arguments for considering the security implications of 
water resources management are found. 
 
This paper investigates both the global water crisis – too 
little clean freshwater for too many people, and global 
water conflict – the political tensions that result.  
 
WATER AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 
 
An increasingly prevalent viewpoint about water and 
security is best summed up by Ismail Serageldin, vice-
president of the World Bank: “The wars of the next 
century will be about water” (quoted in the New York 
Times 10 August 1995).  The view that water will lead 
to acute international conflict, one that is often tied to 
causal arguments of environmental security, 
unfortunately is gaining ground in both academic and 
popular literature.  Some authors assume a natural link 
between water scarcity and acute conflict, suggesting 
that “competition for limited . . . freshwater . . . leads to 
severe political tensions and even to war” (Westing 
1986).  Others, often citing examples from the arid and 
hostile Middle East, assume that “history is replete with 
examples of violent conflict over water” (Butts 1997).   
Still others, combining this “natural” connection 
between water and conflict with assumed historic 
evidence, forecast: “The renewable resource most likely 
to stimulate interstate resource war is river water” 
(Homer-Dixon 1994). 
 
There are two major problems with the literature that 
describes water both as a historic and, by extrapolation, 
as a future cause of acute international conflict: 
 
1. There is little historic evidence that water has ever 
been the cause of international warfare; and 
 
2. War over water seems neither strategically rational, 
hydrographically effective, nor economically viable. 
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WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE OF A LINK 
BETWEEN WATER AND INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICT? 
 
One component of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute 
Database Project2 at Oregon State University has been an 
assessment of historic cases of international water 
conflicts.  In order to counter the prevailing anecdotal 
approach, researchers associated with the project utilized 
the most systematic collection of international conflict – 
Brecher and Wilkenfeld’s (1997) International Crisis 
Behavior data set – and supplemented their investigation 
with available primary and secondary sources.  This search 
revealed a total of seven cases in which armies were 
mobilized or shots were fired across international 
boundaries – in every case, the dispute did not degrade into 
warfare.3  According to our findings, with one exception 
(now almost 4,500 years old),4 there has not been a war 
fought over water. 
It is, however, disingenuous to base a discussion about the 
future solely on history.  Part of the basis for predictions of 
future “water wars,” after all, is that we are reaching 
unprecedented demand on relatively decreasing clean water 
supplies.  But there are other arguments against the 
possibility of “water wars.”5  They might include: 
 
 
A Strategic Argument 
 
If one were to launch a war over water, what would be the 
goal?  Presumably, the aggressor would have to be both 
downstream and the regional hegemony – an upstream 
riparian nation would have no cause to launch an attack 
and a weaker nation would be foolhardy to do so.  An 
upstream riparian nation, then, would have to initiate an 
action, which decreases either quantity or quality, knowing 
that doing so will antagonize a stronger down-stream 
neighbor. 
 
The down-stream power would then have to decide 
whether to launch an attack – if the project were a dam, 
destroying it would result in a wall of water rushing back 
on down-stream territory.  Were it a quality-related project, 
either industrial or waste treatment, destroying it would 
probably result in even worse quality than before.  
Furthermore, the hegemony would have to weigh not only 
an invasion, but an occupation and depopulation of the 
entire watershed in order to forestall any retribution – 
otherwise, it would be simple to pollute the water source of 
the invading power.  It is unlikely that both countries 
would be democracies, since the political scientists tell us 
that democracies do not go to war against each other, and 
the international community would have to refuse to 
become involved (this, of course, is the least far-fetched 
aspect of the scenario).  All of this effort would be 
expended for a resource that costs about one U.S. dollar 
per cubic meter to create from seawater. 
 
 
A Shared Interest Argument 
 
What is it about water that tends to induce cooperation 
even among riparian nations that are hostile over other 
issues?  The treaties negotiated over international 
waterways offer some insight into this question.  Each 
treaty shows sometimes exquisite sensitivity to the unique 
setting and needs of each basin, and many detail the shared 
interests a common waterway will bring.  Along larger 
waterways, for instance, the better dam sites are usually 
upstream at the headwaters where valley walls are steeper 
and where, incidentally, the environmental impact of dams 
is not as great.  The prime agricultural land is generally 
downstream, where the gradient drops off and alluvial 
deposits enrich the soil.  A dam in the headwaters, then, 
not only provides hydropower and other benefits for the 
upstream riparian nation, it also can be managed to evenly 
control the flow for the benefit of downstream agriculture, 
or to enhance water transportation for the benefit of both 
riparian nations.  Other examples of shared interests 
abound: the development of a river that acts as a boundary 
cannot take place without cooperation; farmers, 
environmentalists, and recreational users all share an 
interest in seeing a healthy stream-system; and all riparian 
nations share an interest in high quality water. 
 
 
An Institutional Resiliency Argument 
 
Another factor adding to the political stability of 
international watersheds is that once cooperative water 
regimes are established, they turn out to be tremendously 
resilient over time, even between otherwise hostile riparian 
nations, and even as conflict is waged over other issues.  
For example, the Mekong Committee has functioned since 
1957, exchanging data throughout the Vietnam War.  
Secret “picnic table” talks have been held between Israel 
and Jordan, since the unsuccessful Johnston negotiations 
of 1953-55, even as these riparian nations were in a legal 
state of war until recently.  And, the Indus River 
Commission not only survived through two wars between 
India and Pakistan, but treaty-related payments continued 
unabated throughout the hostilities. 
 
Any of these arguments, in and of itself, might not 
convince one of the unlikelihood of “water wars.”  The 
combination of all of these factors, though – a historic lack 
of evidence combined with strategic, interest-based, and 
institutional irrationality of acute international hydro-
conflicts – should help convince us to think of water as a 
vehicle for reducing tensions and encouraging cooperation 
even between otherwise hostile co-riparian nations.  
Undala Alam (1998) has aptly dubbed this concept of 
water as a resource that transcends traditional thinking 
about resource-related disputes, “water rationality.” 
 
 
IF NOT “WATER WARS,” THEN WHAT ARE THE 
SECURITY ISSUES? 
 
The concept of “environmental security” is not restricted to 
a presumed causal relationship between environmental 
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issues and international warfare.  Much of the thinking on 
the issue has evolved to incorporate a broader sense of 
“human security” – a much more inclusive concept which 
stresses the intricate set of relationships between 
environment and society.6 
 
Until now it is only the relationship between international 
armed conflict and water resources as a scarce resource 
that has been described.  Internal disputes, such as those 
between interests of states/provinces, were excluded, as 
were those where water was a means, method, or victim of 
warfare.  Also excluded were disputes where water is 
incidental to the main issue, such as those about fishing 
rights, access to ports, transportation, or river boundaries. 
 
It is important to understand, therefore, that there is history 
of water-related violence.  It is a history of incidents that 
are at the sub-national level, generally between tribes, 
water-use sectors, or states/provinces.  Examples of 
internal water conflicts, in fact, are quite prevalent.  They 
range from interstate violence and death along the Cauvery 
River in India, to California farmers blowing up a pipeline 
meant for Los Angeles, to much of the violent history in 
the Americas between indigenous peoples and European 
settlers.  The desert state of Arizona in the United States 
even commissioned a navy (made up of one ferryboat) and 
sent its state militia to stop a dam and diversion on the 
Colorado River in 1934. 
 
While these “flashpoints” can and do occur at the sub-
national level, the more common security issue is both 
more subtle and more pervasive.  As water quality and/or 
quantity degrades over time within a local setting, the 
effect on the stability of a region can be unsettling.  Since 
the degradation generally occurs slowly over time, it is 
difficult to say precisely where its impact begins and ends; 
yet the effects can be profound.  Take, for example, the 
case of the Gaza Strip where, over the thirty years the 
region was under Israeli occupation, water quality steadily 
deteriorated, saltwater intrusion degraded local wells, and 
water-related diseases took a rising toll on the population.  
In 1987, the intifada, or Palestinian uprising, broke out in 
the Gaza Strip, and quickly spread throughout the West 
Bank.  Was water quality the cause?  It would be 
disingenuous to identify such direct causality.  Was it an 
irritant which exacerbated an already tenuous situation?  
Undoubtedly. 
 
Moreover, one need look no further than relations between 
India and Bangladesh to note that these internal 
instabilities can be both caused and exacerbated by 
international water disputes.  At issue is a barrage that 
India built at Farakka, which diverts a portion of the 
Ganges flow away from its course into Bangladesh, and 
towards Calcutta 100 miles to the south, in order to flush 
silt away from that city's seaport.  Adverse effects in 
Bangladesh resulting from reduced upstream flow have 
included degradation of both surface and groundwater, 
impeded navigation, increased salinity, degraded fisheries, 
and danger to water supplies and public health.  Migration 
out of affected areas has further compounded the problem.  
Ironically, many of those displaced in Bangladesh have 
found refuge in India. 
 
So, while no “water wars” have occurred, there is ample 
evidence that the lack of clean freshwater has led to 
occasionally intense political instability, and that on a 
small scale, acute violence can result.  What we seem to be 
finding, in fact, is that geographic scale and intensity of 
conflict are inversely related. 
 
Finally, there is the security issue of “simple” human 
suffering.  Again, five million people die each year from 
water-related diseases or inadequate sanitation.  More than 
half the people in the world lack adequate sanitation.  
Eighty percent of disease in the developing world is related 
to water.  With a crisis this clearly defined over a resource 
this vital, the threats to security seem almost self-evident. 
 
HOW ARE WE EQUIPPED INSTITUTIONALLY TO 
HANDLE WATER SECURITY? 
 
Resolving the global water crisis, and ameliorating the 
attendant political stresses, increasingly will involve 
sophisticated mechanisms for cooperation.  Current legal 
and institutional capacities are limited, but strides are being 
made slowly.  Addressing both the water crisis and water 
conflict, global institutions both foster good relations 
among sovereign neighbors and improve capabilities for 
water resources management. 
 
Legal Principles 
 
Generalized legal principles for the management of 
transboundary waters are currently defined by the 
Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, ratified by the U.N. General Assembly in 
1997.  The Convention, which took 27 years to develop, 
reflects the difficulty of marrying legal and hydrologic 
intricacies: while the Convention provides many important 
principles, including responsibility for cooperation and 
joint management, it is also vague and occasionally 
contradictory.  The Convention also provides few practical 
guidelines for water allocations – the heart of most water 
conflict.  Neither these principles, nor those of the 
Convention's precursors – the 1966 Helsinki Rules or 
subsequent draft articles by international legal bodies – 
have been explicitly invoked in more than a handful of 
water negotiations or treaties. 
 
Furthermore, international law only concerns itself with the 
rights and responsibilities between nations.  Some political 
entities that might claim water rights, therefore, would not 
be represented, such as the Palestinians along the Jordan River 
or Kurds along the Euphrates River.  In addition, cases are 
heard by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) only with the 
consent of the parties involved; and no practical enforcement 
mechanism exists to back up the Court’s findings, except in 
the most extreme cases.  A nation with pressing national 
interests can, therefore, disclaim entirely the court’s 
jurisdiction or findings.  Since its creation in 1945, the ICJ has 
decided only a single case regarding international waters. 
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International Institutions 
 
Just as the flow of water totally ignores political boundaries, 
so too does its management strain the capabilities of 
institutions.  No global institution currently exists for the 
management of transboundary water resources.  Several UN 
agencies, including UNEP, UNDP, UNESCO, WHO, FAO, 
and UNIDO, incorporate water related issues in their charter, 
as does the World Bank.  All of these agencies recently 
collaborated in production of the Comprehensive Assessment 
of the Freshwater Resources of the World (CAFRW).  Many 
global water-related agencies have also recently cooperated in 
formation of the Global Water Partnership that aims to 
coordinate water policy worldwide.  The World Water Council 
was also established recently as a self-described “think tank” 
for world water resources issues.  However, none of these 
agencies incorporate mechanisms for the resolution of 
transboundary water resources disputes within their mandates. 
 
Many of the most productive efforts at the international level 
are brought about by strong personalities within agencies 
and/or through ad hoc collaborations between agencies.  The 
1960 Indus Water Treaty owes much to David Black, then-
president of the World Bank; the Mekong Committee was 
formed due primarily to an alliance between UNECAFE and 
the US Bureau of Reclamation; and the 1994 Danube River 
Protection Convention involved leadership from UNDP, the 
World Bank, and the Commission of European Communities.  
Occasionally, initiative is offered through economic and 
political alliances, as has been the case with the European 
Union’s water quality guidelines, and the Southern African 
Development Community’s protocol on Shared Watercourse 
Systems. 
 
International Water Treaties 
 
In the absence of detailed water law, adequate institutions, or 
warfare, the countries that incorporate the world's 261 
international waterways have managed to muddle through.  
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization has identified 
more than 3,600 treaties relating to international water 
resources dating between AD 805 and 1984, the majority of 
which deal with some aspect of navigation.  Since 1814, states 
have negotiated a smaller body of treaties that deal with non-
navigational issues of water management, flood control, 
hydropower projects, or allocations for consumptive or non-
consumptive uses in international basins.  The Transboundary 
Freshwater Dispute Database project includes an online 
collection of 145 of these treaties, which include only those 
dating from 1870 and later which deal with water per se, and 
exclude those that deal only with boundaries, navigation, or 
fishing rights. 
 
 Table 1.  Treaty Statistics Summary Sheet 
 
Signatories 
Bilateral 124 out of a total 145 treaties, or 86% 
Multilateral 21/145 (14%) 
 
Principal Focus 
Water Supply 53/145 (37%) 
Hydropower 57/145 (39%) 
Flood Control 13/145 (9%) 
Industrial Uses 9/145 (6%) 
Navigation 6/145 (4%) 
Pollution 6/145 (4%) 
Fishing 1/145 (<1%) 
 
Monitoring 
Provided 78/145 (54%) 
No/Not Available 67/145 (46%) 
 
Conflict Resolution 
Council 43/145 (30%) 
Other Governmental Unit 9/145 (6%) 
United Nations/Third Party 14/145 (10%) 
None/Not Available 79/145 (54%) 
 
Enforcement 
Council 26/145 (18%) 
Force 2/145 (1%) 
Economic 1/145 (<1%) 
None/Not Available 116/145 (80%) 
 
Unequal Power Relationship 
Yes 52/145 (36%) 
No/Unclear 93/145 (64%) 
 
Information Sharing 
Yes 93/145 (64%) 
No/Not Available 52/145 (36%) 
 
Water Allocation 
Equal Portions 15/145 (10%) 
Complex but Clear 39/145 (27%) 
Unclear 14/145 (10%) 
None/Not Available 77/145 (53%) 
 
Non-Water Linkages 
Money 44/145 (30%) 
Land 6/145 (4%) 
Political Concessions 2/145 (1%) 
Other Linkages 10/145 (7%) 
No Linkages 83/145 (57%) 
Source: Hamner and Wolf (1998). 
Despite their number and rich history, these 145 treaties 
reveal that the legal management of transboundary rivers is 
still in its conceptual infancy.  More than half of these 
treaties include no monitoring provisions whatsoever, and 
perhaps as a consequence, two-thirds do not delineate 
specific allocations and four-fifths have no enforcement 
mechanism.  Moreover, those treaties, which do allocate 
specific quantities, allocate a fixed amount to all riparian 
nations but one – that one nation must then accept the 
balance of the river flow, regardless of fluctuations.  
Finally, multilateral basins are, almost without exception, 
governed by bilateral treaties, precluding the integrated 
basin management long-advocated by water managers. 
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WHAT TECHNICAL/POLICY OPTIONS ARE 
AVAILABLE? 
 
The solutions to this crisis are complex and expensive.  
They range from agricultural to technological to economic 
and public policies, but they all fall under the same three 
basic categories as for any resource shortage: increase 
supply, decrease demand, or improve the quality. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1: Water management options to increase supply, decrease demand, or improve quality 
 
UNILATERAL OPTIONS 
 
DEMAND 
 
• Urban/industrial demand management. 
• Rationing. 
• Public awareness. 
• Allow price of water to reflect true costs. 
• Efficient agriculture, including drip irrigation, greenhouse technology, and genetic 
engineering for drought and salinity resistance. 
 
 
SUPPLY 
 
• Wastewater reclamation. 
• Increase catchment and storage (including artificial groundwater recharge). 
• Cloud seeding. 
• Desalination. 
• Fossil aquifer development. 
 
 
QUALITY 
 
• Treat drinking water supplies at its most appropriate level. 
• Work towards universal sanitation. 
• Eradicate water-related disease through water treatment and/or vaccination programs. 
 
 
COOPERATIVE OPTIONS 
 
• Shared information and technology. 
• International water markets to increase distributive efficiency (where appropriate). 
• Inter-basin water transfers. 
• Joint regional planning and coordination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some of the current issues include: 
 
Increasing Supply 
 
New Natural Sources.  No new rivers are likely to be 
discovered in the world, but more efficient management of 
existing sources and greater catchment of floodwaters, perhaps 
stored underground through artificial groundwater recharge, 
can add to supplies just as effectively. 
 
New Sources Through Technology.  Projects like iceberg 
towing and cloud-seeding, though appealing to the 
imagination, do not seem to be the most likely direction for 
future technology.  The two more likely (although more 
mundane) means to increase water supply for the future are 
desalination and wastewater reclamation.  High costs have 
precluded both – particularly desalination for most uses, 
although efforts are being made to lower these costs through 
  34 
multiple use plants (getting desalted water as a byproduct in a 
plant designed primarily for energy generation), increased 
energy efficiency in plant design, and by augmenting 
conventional plant power with solar or other energy sources. 
 
Decreasing Demand 
 
Agricultural Sector.  Agriculture is far and away the leading 
consumer of water resources, taking about 70 percent of 
withdrawals worldwide.  Technological advances like drip-
irrigation and micro-sprinklers are 20-50 percent more 
efficient than standard sprinklers and tremendously more so 
than the open-ditch flood method.  Computerized control 
systems, working in conjunction with direct soil moisture 
measurements can add even more precision to crop irrigation.  
Other water savings have come through bioengineered crops 
that exist on a minimal amount of freshwater, on brackish 
water, or even on the direct application of saltwater. 
 
Economic Water Efficiency.  Water costs worldwide are highly 
subsidized, especially water earmarked for agriculture.  
Economic theory argues that only when the price paid for a 
commodity is a reasonable reflection of the true price can 
market forces work for efficient distribution of the commodity.  
Take away subsidies and allow the price to rise, it is argued, 
and market incentives are created for both greater efficiency 
on the farm and a natural shift of water resources from the 
agricultural sector to industry, where contribution to GNP per 
unit of water is often much higher.  These arguments, though, 
tread through quite sensitive territory, have serious 
implications for equity, and often overlook other effects of 
urbanization. 
 
Improving Quality 
 
The strategies for improving quality have long been known: 
clean water both before and after it is used, and eradicate 
water-related diseases.  The problem has too often been a 
“simple” lack of funds and/or coordination for this enormous 
task.  The near eradication of dracunculiasis (guinea worm) in 
this decade provides a good example of a successful focused 
effort, coordinated between UN agencies and national and 
local governments, where attention was paid to all aspects of 
the disease and its transmission, from surveys and education to 
treatment and containment.7 
 
WHAT ARE THE MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED 
WHICH HAVE POLICY IMPLICATIONS? 
 
The most critical security lessons learned from the global 
experience in water security are as follows: 
 
1. Water that crosses international boundaries can exacerbate 
relations between nations that share the basin.  While the 
tension is not likely to lead to warfare, early coordination 
between riparian states can help ameliorate the issue 
entirely. 
 
2. Once international institutions are in place, they are 
tremendously resilient over time, even between otherwise 
hostile riparians, and even as conflict is waged over other 
issues. 
 
3. More likely than international “flashpoints” is a gradual 
decreasing of water quantity and/or quality, which over 
time can affect the internal stability of a nation or region, 
and act as an irritant between ethnic groups, water sectors, 
or states/provinces.  The resulting instability can spill into 
the international arena. 
 
4. The greatest human security threat of the global water 
crisis comes about not from the threat of warfare, or even 
from political instability, but rather from the simple fact 
that millions of people lack access to sufficient quantities 
of this critical resource at sufficient quality for their well 
being. 
 
 
WHAT TYPES OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
CAN ONE MAKE? 
 
Given these lessons, what can the international community 
do? 
 
International Institutions: 
 
Water dispute amelioration is as important, more effective, 
and less costly than conflict resolution.  Watershed 
commissions should be developed for those basins that do 
not have them, and strengthened for those that do. 
 
Three traits of international waters – the fact that conflict is 
invariably sub-acute, that dangerous flashpoints can be 
averted when institutions are established early, and that 
such institutions are tremendously resilient over time – 
inform this recommendation.  Early intervention is also 
beneficial to the process of conflict resolution, helping to 
shift the mode of dispute from costly, impasse oriented 
dynamics to less costly, problem solving dynamics.  In the 
heat of some flashpoints, such as the Nile, the Indus, and 
the Jordan, as armed conflict seemed imminent, 
tremendous energy was spent just getting the parties to talk 
to each other.  In contrast, discussions in the Mekong 
Committee, the multilateral working group in the Middle 
East and on the Danube, have all moved beyond the causes 
of immediate disputes on to actual, practical projects that 
may be implemented in an integrative framework. 
 
 
Funding and Aid Agencies: 
 
Water-related aid needs to be coordinated and focused, 
relating quality, quantity, groundwater, surfacewater, and 
local socio-political settings in an integrated fashion.  
Funding should be commensurate with the responsibility 
these agencies have for alleviating the global water crisis. 
 
Ameliorating the crux of water security – the crisis of 
human suffering – often rests with these agencies which, 
given the size of the crisis, are extraordinarily 
underfunded.  One can contrast the resources spent on 
issues such as global change and arms control in efforts to 
protect against potential loss of life in the future, while 
millions die in the present due to a lack of access to clean 
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fresh water.  Agencies such as USAID, CIDA, and JICA 
have the technical expertise and experience to help, yet are 
hindered by political and budget constraints.  Funding 
agencies often are hamstrung by local politics.  A powerful 
argument might be made for the fact that water-related 
disease costs the global economy US$125 billion per year, 
while ameliorating them would “only” cost US$7-50 
billion (Gleick, 1998).  Projects such as USAID’s Project 
Forward, which integrates water management with conflict 
resolution training, offer models for the future. 
 
Universities and Research Agencies: 
 
Universities and research agencies can best contribute to 
the alleviation of the water crisis in three major ways: 1) 
acquire, analyze, and coordinate the primary data 
necessary for good empirical work; 2) identify indicators 
of future water disputes and/or insecurity in regions most 
at risk; and 3) train tomorrow’s water managers in an 
integrated fashion. 
 
The internet’s initial mandate is still one of the best: to 
allow communication between researchers around the 
world to exchange information and enhance collaboration.  
The surfeit of primary data currently threatens an 
information overload in the developed world, while the 
most basic information can be lacking in the developing 
world.  University programs such as the Institute of Earth, 
Oceans, and Space at the University of New Hampshire are 
working to ferret out useful global hydrological data, while 
encouraging greater collection and dissemination 
capabilities where they are lacking.  Data availability not 
only allows for greater understanding of the physical world 
but, by adding parameters from the socio-political realm, 
indicators showing regions at risk in the future can be 
identified.  Such projects are taking place for human 
security at the University of Victoria, and for indicators of 
water dispute at Oregon State University.  Finally, 
universities are slowly recognizing that water is, by its 
nature, an exceptionally interdisciplinary resource and that 
the attendant disputes can only be resolved through active 
dialog among fields as diverse as science, law, economics, 
religion, and ethics.  It is difficult enough to find university 
programs at the graduate level which adequately train 
students in water from a truly interdisciplinary perspective, 
allowing for exposure to both the science and policy of 
water resources (there are maybe four such programs in the 
entire United States) but there is no program which 
explicitly adds the international component. 
 
Private Industry: 
 
Private industry has historically taken the lead in large 
development projects.  As the emphasis in world water 
shifts to a smaller scale, and from a focus on supply to one 
on demand management and improved quality, private 
industry has much to offer. 
 
Private industry has three traits that can be harnessed to 
help ameliorate the world water crisis: their reach 
transcends national boundaries, their resources are 
generally greater than those of public institutions, and their 
strategic planning is generally unmatched.  Historically, 
private companies such as Bechtel and Lyonnaise des Eaux 
have been involved primarily in large development 
projects, while the smaller scale projects have been left to 
aid agencies to develop.  Recently, a shift in thinking has 
taken place in some corporate board rooms.  Bank of 
America, for example, was not involved in the California-
wide process of water planning until recently, when its 
president noticed that practically all of the bank’s 
investments relied on a safe, stable supply of water.  This 
was true whether the investments were in micro-chip 
manufacturing, mortgages, or the more traditional 
agriculture.  When the bank became involved in the “Cal-
Fed Plan,” bringing with it its lawyers, planning expertise, 
and facilitators, not to mention its financial resources, 
progress was made in several areas which had till then 
been mired down in impasse. 
 
Civil Society: 
 
Inherent in our recognition that the most serious problems 
of water security are those at the local level, is the 
attendant recognition that civil society is among the best 
suited to address local issues. 
 
One recurrent pattern in water resources development and 
management has been a series of projects or approaches 
which are in opposition to local values or customs.  These 
projects can be as large as dams which displace hundreds 
of thousands of people and wipe out sites of cultural and 
religious heritage; as heedless as promoting water markets 
among religious groups for whom the idea is sacrilege; or 
as seemingly minor as cutting down a tree which is sacred 
to a village djinn.  In recent years, as a consequence, the 
idea of including those affected by a project into the 
decisionmaking process has taken hold.  Moreover, some 
aspects of civil society have both local roots and a global 
reach.  Rotary International, for example, was awarded the 
1997 Crystal Drop Award, the most prestigious 
institutional award of the International Water Resources 
Association, for its coordinated efforts in water supply and 
sanitation projects throughout the world. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The global water crisis has led to a large and growing 
literature warning of future “water wars,” and pointing to 
water not only as a cause of historic armed conflict, but as 
the resource which will bring combatants to the battlefield 
in the 21st century.  The historic reality has been quite 
different – we have not, and probably will not, go to war 
over water.  In modern times, only seven minor skirmishes 
have been waged over international waters.  Conversely, 
over 3,600 treaties have been signed over different aspects 
of international waters – 145 in this century on water qua 
water – many showing tremendous elegance and creativity 
for dealing with this critical resource.  This is not to say 
that armed conflict has not taken place over water, only 
that such disputes generally are between tribes, water-use 
sectors, or states/provinces.  What we seem to be finding, 
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in fact, is that geographic scale and intensity of conflict are 
inversely related. 
 
While the patterns described in this paper suggest that the 
more valuable lesson of international water is as a resource 
whose characteristics tend to induce cooperation and incite 
violence only in the exception, one should not lose sight of 
the truly dire straits that have been brought about by the 
global water crisis.  The critical problems that need 
addressing are neither of wars nor of politics, but rather of 
“simply” getting an adequate supply of clean freshwater to 
the people of the world. 
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USEFUL WEB ADDRESSES 
 
The International Water Resources Association (IWRA) 
 
IWRA has strived to improve water management 
worldwide through dialogue, education, and research for 
over 25 years. Since its official formation in 1972, the 
organization has actively promoted the sustainable 
management of water resources around the globe. The 
world is a much smaller place today than when IWRA 
began its work due to advancing technologies and global 
social changes. The belief that sustainability requires 
interdisciplinary action and international cooperation is a 
driving force behind the association. IWRA seeks to 
improve water resource outcomes by improving our 
collective understanding of the physical, biological, 
chemical, institutional, and socioeconomic aspects of 
water.     <http://www.iwra.siu.edu/> 
 
The Pacific Institute 
 
The Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, 
Environment, and Security is an independent, non-profit 
center created in 1987 to conduct research and policy 
analysis in the areas of environment, sustainable 
  37 
development, and international security. Underlying all of 
the Institute's work is the recognition that the pressing 
problems of environmental degradation, regional and 
global poverty, and political tension and conflict are 
fundamentally interrelated, and that long-term solutions 
require an interdisciplinary perspective. 
<http://www.pacinst.org/> 
 
The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database 
 
The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, an 
ongoing research effort at Oregon State University, 
currently includes a computer compilation of 150 water-
related treaties and 39 US inter-state compacts, catalogued 
by basin, countries or states involved, date signed, treaty 
topic, allocations measure, conflict resolution mechanisms, 
and non-water linkages.  The Database also includes a 
digitized inventory of international watersheds, negotiating 
notes and background material on 14 case-studies of 
conflict resolution, news files on cases of acute water-
related conflict, and assessments of indigenous/traditional 
methods of water conflict resolution. 
<http://terra.geo.orst.edu/users/tfdd> 
 
The Water Web 
 
The WaterWeb consortium has been created to promote the 
sharing of information concerning water and the earth’s 
environment. The organization seeks to create a global 
community, bringing together educational, governmental, 
nonprofit, and commercial entities interested in water 
research, conservation, and management. WaterWeb’s 
goals are to advance water related issues, promote the use 
of quality information, and share information with water 
use stakeholders and decisionmakers.  
<http://www.waterweb.org/> 
 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
                                            
1  A shorter version of this paper appeared as, Wolf, A. 
“Water and Human Security.” AVISO: An Information 
Bulletin on Global Environmental Change and Human 
Security. Bulletin #3, June 1999. 
 
2   For more information on the Database Project, see A. Wolf. 
“The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database Project.” 
Water International. December 1999 (forthcoming). 
 
3   For a list of conflicts see A. Wolf,  1999.  “Water Wars” 
and Water Reality: Conflict and Cooperation along 
International Waterways.  In S.L. Lonergan (Ed.), 
Environmental Change, Adaptation and Human Security, 
(forthcoming).  Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
4  The exception is the earliest documented interstate conflict 
known, a dispute between the Sumerian city-states of Lagash 
and Umma over the right to exploit boundary channels along 
the Tigris in 2,500 BCE (Cooper 1983).  In other words, the 
last and only “water war” was 4,500 years ago. 
                                                                     
 
5 These arguments are described in more detail in A. Wolf, 
1999. “Water Wars” and Water Reality: Conflict and 
Cooperation along International Waterways.  
 
6  For a more detailed discussion of these issues see, S. C. 
Lonergan (1997) Global Environmental Change and Human 
Security.  In Changes 5.  Ottawa: Canadian Global Change 
Program - The Royal Society of Canada.  
 
7   Gleick (1998) provides more detail on this and other water 
quality examples. 
 
